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SUMMARY: 1. On the religious significance of baptismal crosses and grounds for the 
need for Orthodox Christian believers to wear them – 2. On the illegitimate nature of 
the ban imposed by the state on the wearing of baptismal symbols of Christian 
religious affiliation – 3. Absence of any grounds for assessing the religious rite of 
wearing Christian baptismal crosses as a threat to public safety, public order, health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others – 4. The groundless emasculation, denial 
and reduction of the religious meaning and importance of Christian baptismal crosses. 
 
 
1 - On the religious significance of baptismal crosses and grounds for 
the need for Orthodox Christian believers to wear them 
 
In Orthodox Christianity, the need to wear around one’s neck some 
symbols of religious affiliation such as Christian crosses (small items 
symbolizing Christian crucifix) is determined by the religious significance 
they have had in Orthodox Church since ancient times. It is an integral 
part of the freedom to confess one’s faith in the context of age-old 
Christian tradition. It is also a rule prescribed to Orthodox Christians by 
canonical regulation norms (canon law, lex canonical). Through the 
observance of this rule, the significance of the cross as a symbol of 
Christian self-sacrifice sustains the religious self-identification of believers. 
In this act of confessing their faith, Orthodox Christians express their 
spiritual unity with and belonging to Christianity in pursuance of 
imperatives based on the canonical understanding of the meaning of the 
Christian cross1. 
The obligation for Orthodox Christian to wear a baptismal cross 
basically follows indirectly from Canons 73 and 82 of the Sixth Ecumenical 
                                                 
*** The text, accepted by the Director, reproduces the joint Conclusion by the 
Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 
France) and the Institute for State-Confessional Relations and Law (Moscow, Russia). 
 
 
1 Mt. 10:38 and 23:19; Lk. 9: 23; Mk. 8: 34; 1 Cor. 1: 23–24; Ex. 29, 37; 2 Tim. 2: 8; Gal. 6: 
14, etc. 
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Council (of Constantinople) and a number of other provisions of lex 
canonica. 
The tradition of the obligatory wearing of a Christian baptismal 
cross (in some Christian denominations it is analogous to wearing a 
special medallion with an image of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary or a 
saint) has for Orthodox Christians an absolute value and has the following 
moral-religious, religious-communicative and religious-ritual meaning: 
– as a free expression and manifestation of one’s religious belonging 
and religious and cultural identity through the constant wearing of the 
most important Christian symbol as the only means of such expression 
existing in Orthodox Church. Although the cross represents the central 
symbol of Christian religion, the wearing of a Christian baptismal cross 
has never been of imposing nature and has never had as its aim to 
necessarily show or obtrusively demonstrate it to other people, since it is 
mostly worn next to the skin or may not be covered by one’s clothes to be 
visible, for instance, in a low neck, but it is always unobtrusive because of 
the cross’s small size; 
– as the constant accomplishment of a religious rite which identifies 
a person as Orthodox Christian including in his or her self-awareness. It is 
a voluntary commitment of an Orthodox Christian effective since his or 
her baptism and at the same time realizing his or her religious freedom 
and religious affiliation with Orthodox Church and with Christianity in 
general; 
– as a voluntary and conscious religious commitment to Christian 
commandments imposed on a Orthodox Christian by canonical regulation 
norms. 
 
 
2 - On the illegitimate nature of the ban imposed by the state on the 
wearing of baptismal symbols of Christian religious affiliation 
 
The private nature of one’s confession of a religion (which does not 
conflict with collective religious freedoms) implies that all the decisions as 
to the ways of confessing the faith is a matter of personal choice based on 
canonical rules. The sphere of relations involved in freedom of faith by 
virtue of their unique social and individual psychological nature cannot be 
regulated by law in principle, considering existing cultural peculiarities 
and national, public and legal traditions. 
Article 9, Par. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
establishes guarantees for  
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“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance”. 
 
These rights guaranteed by the Convention protect another right based on 
freedom of conscience and freedom of beliefs, which belongs to everyone 
from birth and which is derived from these rights, namely, the right to 
freely wear religious symbols on religious grounds, exercised as an 
element of the right to freely confess one’s religion. 
Moreover, the legal regime of the secularity of a state cannot 
warrant the legality of its ban on actions involved in manifestation, 
expression and confession by its citizens of their religious faith and beliefs 
including celebration of religious rites rooted in their religious tradition. 
In the two cases under consideration, the respondent state (United 
Kingdom) has adopted its decisions as to the legal possibility and validity 
of a ban on the wearing of Christian baptismal crosses in the perfectly 
obvious situation of a complete absence of any legal or social need to 
impose such a ban in the interests of public safety, public order, health or 
morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The absence of 
such bans in European states for decades and centuries (except for the 
periods of totalitarian regimes in some countries) is a convincing proof 
that there is no need whatsoever for imposing such bans. 
International conventions on human rights with their norms 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion have helped to fix in 
national legislations the sets of legal norms for recognition, respect, 
assurance and protection given by the state to the internal self-
organization of religious bodies and freedom of religion. It is a direct 
consequence of the secular nature of the state as one of the fundamental 
constitutional and legal foundations of modern democratic states 
governed by the rule of law. 
The questions concerning the need to wear next-to-skin symbols of 
one’s religious affiliation and the extent to which it is obligatory belong 
exclusively to the jurisdiction of religious organizations themselves. 
Therefore, a secular state, because of imperative requirements defined by 
secularity, has no right to interfere in these processes (to dictate to 
believers whether they should or should not wear baptismal crosses) or 
even to make official public statements concerning the obligatory or not 
obligatory nature of wearing such underclothes symbols of religious 
affiliation or to assess the nature of such symbols by dividing them into 
religious and non-religious (as decoration or something else). 
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Our approach stated here is consistent with the positions taken by 
the European Court of Human Rights and set forth in a number of its 
resolutions. 
The Court in its resolution on the case of Manoussakis and others v. 
Greece2 stated that  
 
“the Court has consistently left the Contracting States a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent of the 
necessity of an interference, but this Margin is subject to European 
supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions 
applying it. The Court's task is to determine whether the measures 
taken at national level were justified in principle and proportionate” 
(§ 44).  
 
In this decision the Court recognized as illegitimate any coercion into 
action and bearing the consequences because of one’s religious beliefs, 
specifically, the turning of “the apparently innocent requirement of action 
from a mere formality into a lethal weapon against the right to freedom of 
religion” (§ 41). 
As far as the manifestation (demonstration) on one’s religious and 
cultural identity is concerned, the resolution on the case of Kokkinakis v. 
Greece3 and some other cases, the European Court of Human Rights has 
been steadfast in advocating its position that “While religious freedom is 
primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, 
freedom to "manifest [one's] religion". Bearing witness in words and deeds 
is bound up with the existence of religious convictions” (§ 31). The 
wording “bearing witness in words and deeds” quite clearly encompasses 
the wearing of a Christian baptismal cross. 
The European Court has repeatedly pointed out that  
 
“the imposition of administrative or criminal sanctions for 
manifestation of religious belief or exercise the right to freedom of 
religion was an interference with the rights guaranteed under Article 
9 § 1 of the Convention”4. 
 
In its resolution on the case of Van den Dungen v. Netherland of 
February 22, 1995, the ECHR stated that Article 9 of the Convention  
                                                 
2 November 26, 1996. 
3 May 25, 1993. 
4 § 61 of the Judgment on the case of Nolan and K. v. Russia, February 12, 1994. See also, 
§ 39 of the Court’s Judgment on the case of Serif v. Greece; § 38 of the Court’s Judgment on 
the case of Larissis and Others v. Greece, February 24, 1998; § 36 of the Court’s Judgment on 
the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece, May 25, 1993. 
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“primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious 
creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum. In 
addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked to these 
attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the 
practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognized form”5. 
 
In its judgment on the case of Lautsi v. Italy of March 18, 2011, the 
Great Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights accepted the 
arguments of Italian authorities that schoolchildren are not forbidden 
from wearing Islamic headscarf or other symbols or clothes having 
religious meaning as a convincing proof that the presence of crucifixes in 
Italian schools does not violate the rights of others guaranteed by Article 9 
of the Convention. By the same resolution the ECHR Great Chamber 
reiterated the meaning of the cross as a historical, cultural and religious 
symbol (§ 71-73, etc.).  
The complaints filed by Nadia Eweida and Shirley Chaplin against 
Great Britain concerning the proposal made by administrators of the 
organization in which they worked to realize their “freedom of choice” by 
their own option between compliance with the demand to stop wearing a 
Christian cross and dismissal reflect direct and apparent discrimination on 
religious grounds, since this option appears not free, accompanied with 
coercion under a threat of bad consequences (dismissal) and constitutes a 
rhetorical cover of actual discrimination on the grounds of religious 
affiliation and convictions. 
 
 
3 - Absence of any grounds for assessing the religious rite of wearing 
Christian baptismal crosses as a threat to public safety, public order, 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment on the case of Leyla 
Sahin v. Turkey of November 10, 2005, Par 121, and its judgment on the 
case of Bruno Pichon et Marie-Line Sajous c. France stated that “Article 9 
does not always guarantee the right to behave in a manner governed by a 
religious belief”. It follows from this that the freedom to realize a religious 
belief has certain limitations. However, these limitations are not formed 
arbitrarily but determined by certain restrictions with regard to the 
Convention’s guarantees of  
 
                                                 
5 § 1 of the Section “Law”. 
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“freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom…, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship…, practice and 
observance” (Convention, Article 9, § 1)  
 
and represent exceptional cases where such bans and limitations are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Convention, 
Article 9, § 2). 
This list of grounds for the limitation of freedom of religion is 
exhaustive, and the appropriate limitations cannot be supplemented 
arbitrarily and discretionarily or interpreted freely. Only weighty and 
convincing reasons falling under the wording of the Convention, Article 9, 
§ 2 can justify a certain limitation of religious freedoms. 
On the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9, § 2, it could be theoretically possible to 
impose a legally and actually justified ban against the wearing by 
Christian believers of Christian baptismal crosses only in the case, 
unobservable in life though, where the wearing of a baptismal cross by a 
Christian constitutes an evident and direct threat to public safety, public 
order, health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. No such 
threat has ever been or can be constituted by the wearing of baptismal 
crosses by Christians. Assumptions to the contrary are devoid of any 
factual basis. 
In the judgment on the case of Dogru v. France of December 4, 20086, 
the European Court underscored that  
 
“the wearing of religious signs was not inherently incompatible with 
the principle of secularism in schools, but became so according to the 
conditions in which they were worn and the consequences that the 
wearing of a sign might have” (§ 70),  
 
while pointing out as an inadmissible form and measure of manifesting 
one’s religious beliefs in public institutions the case where such 
manifestation does not take on the nature of an ostentatious act that would 
constitute a source of pressure and exclusion (§ 71). 
The wearing of a Christian baptismal cross does not pursue such an 
aim, nor does it have the nature of pressure or forceful imposition of this 
religion on others. Assumptions to the contrary are not grounded on fact. 
                                                 
6 The final version dates at March 4, 2009. 
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In its judgment on the case of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation 
Army v. Russia of October 5, 2006, the ECHR recognized that the wearing 
of special elements of clothes (even a uniform) quite can be and can be 
reasonably recognized as “a particular ways of organizing the internal life 
of a religious community and manifesting religious beliefs” (§ 92). 
The bans and punishments known in Europe’s history for wearing 
Christian baptismal crosses happened in the countries and in the periods 
when the totalitarian states pursued the official policy of struggle against 
religion or specifically against Christianity to forcibly consolidate their 
totalitarian ideology which did not allow of the recognition of human 
rights and free confession of one’s religion and beliefs. 
Therefore, the wearing by believers of signs of their religious 
affiliation (belonging) is the realization of the traditional rule of their faith 
which does not contradict the principle of secularity but is determined by 
one’s need and freedom of one’s religious convictions fixed in the 
Convention. At the same time, this freedom does not allow of manifesting 
these signs in the way that can lead to oppression, provocation, aggressive 
proselytism and importunate propaganda or encroaching on the personal 
dignity, rights and freedoms of others. The wearing of a Christian 
baptismal cross does not at all involve such encroachment and by no 
means lead to such. 
The religious freedoms recognized by the Convention provide 
believers with a right to express and manifest their religious faith in 
educational institutions, at the place of their employment, etc. to an extent 
which does not violate the rights of others. 
The actually conflict-free observance of this Christian tradition in 
European countries for a very long period of time has convincingly shown 
that a baptismal cross reflects a certain type of socio-cultural behavior 
consonant with the rules of public morality and public order without 
being a sign of religious extremism or a means of religious proselytism. 
Moreover, the practice of wearing Christian baptismal crosses by Christian 
believers is an integral element of the free confession of their faith and 
beliefs practiced in many Christian Churches and denominations. 
Hence is the absolute absence of any social or legal need to impose 
the ban under consideration in the interests of ensuring public safety, 
public order, health or morality or protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
 
 
4 – The groundless emasculation, denial and reduction of the religious 
meaning and importance of Christian baptismal crosses 
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Some facts that the Christian cross by virtue of its being rooted in the 
European culture is often used as a motive in the design of jewellery and 
that some people sometimes use it as decoration cannot be recognized as a 
sufficient ground for the conclusion that the small Christian cross is 
essentially a decoration devoid of any religious meaning and significance. 
To identify the small Christian cross only with a decoration means 
to groundlessly reduce, up to full denial, its religious value and religious 
ritual meaning and to make an allegation based solely on a subjective 
prejudice and intolerant attitude to this Christian symbol entertained by 
those who see the Christian religion and the tradition under consideration 
in this light. Essentially, the situation under consideration reveals a 
negative attitude to believers, a desire to impose on them anti-religious 
diktat and a certain “secularized” and simplified idea of the Christian 
cross invented by some representatives of society and state. This attitude 
represents a distorted, obtrusive and forcible reduction of the meaning 
and content of the Christian tradition and the internal rule of wearing a 
small Christian cross observed by believers in their life. 
There is a good reason to believe that the demand to ban the 
wearing of small Christian crosses as dictated by religious tradition is 
motivated by a negative, hostile and intolerant attitude to religious and 
cultural values and traditions embodied by this religious symbol (sign) 
and by the denial of any religious presence and any manifestation of 
religious beliefs not only in public sphere, as one of the cases in Great 
Britain has shown, but even the sphere of any public relations whatsoever 
except for personal ones. 
Thereby there are no necessary and sufficient reasons for a public 
ban on the wearing of Christian small baptismal crosses in a way visible to 
those around including in case of believers’ presence in public places and 
institutions. Therefore, the imposition of such a ban does not correspond 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and represents a violation of the Convention by a state body, 
which is detrimental to the basic rights and freedoms of citizens 
(Convention, Article 9). 
Actually, a public ban on the wearing Christian small baptismal 
crosses as a “discreet” form of manifesting one’s religious affiliation which 
does not encroach on the fundamental rights and freedoms of those 
around represents an illegitimate ban for Christians to manifest their 
religion and religious and cultural identity and an act of discrimination 
against believers aimed at ousting Christians from public space. 
